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BOOK REVIEWS
THE DISSENTING OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES. Arranged
with Introductory Notes, by Alfred Lief. Foreword by Dr.
George W. Kirchwey. New York: The Vanguard Press,
1929. Pp. xviii, 314.
The publication of this volume is a tribute to the pervading
influence of the great judge whose more important dissenting
opinions it contains. It may truthfully be said of Mr. Justice
Holmes, unlike so many great men, that general recognition of his
greatness has not been deferred until after death. Even those who
disagree with his philosophy and technique of constitutional inter-
pretation give full credit to his unique qualities of mind and person-
ality, his disinterested devotion to his judicial duties, and the
enduring value and significance of his service in the great court
whose bench he has for so many years adorned. The recent tributes
of Judge Learned Hand and Professor Laski have given felicitous
expression to the attitude of the many who have fallen under his
intellectual sway. To these must now be added Dr. Kirchwey's
beautifully written foreword to this collection of opinions.
To lawyers, jurists, and social scientists already acquainted
with the work of the Supreme Court of the United States, this
volume offers little, if anything, which is new. While there may
be a certain limited utility in having conveniently at hand this col-
lection of Mr. Justice Holmes's noteworthy dissents, such persons
would ordinarily prefer to look to the published reports.
If the purpose of the book is to disseminate more widely among
non-professional readers Justice Holmes's philosophy and to pro-
vide a picture of some of the great issues and conflicts of ideas and
theories in the Supreme Court during the period of his tenure, it
has serious limitations. Not that the time spent by such a reader in
perusing the contents of this book will be wasted. The opinions
are worth reading for their literary qualities alone. The penetrating
acuteness and breadth of view of their author's mind and the
scintillating and epigrammatic style in which they are written are
sources of stimulation and delight. Moreover, this bool may render
a limited service in helping to correct some of the many false or
superficial ideas held by many persons regarding the functions of
the federal Constitution and the proper place of the courts in the
enforcement of it.
It is by no means certain, however, with full respect to the
disarming remarks of Dr. Kirchwey, that the book will afford the
uninitiated reader a fair and undistorted picture either of Mr. Justice
Holmes as a judge or of the warfare of issues and ideas in which
he has played so worthy a part. It is no doubt true that the learned
judge has endeavored to state in his dissenting opinions fully and
fairly the views combatted by him. It may even be admitted that
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he has succeeded in doing so to an unusual degree by reason of his
exceptional judicial temperament and qualities of mind. That he
has been entirely successful in all cases can scarcely be admitted.
His dangerous gift of epigram and the devastating irony which he
sometimes uses to demolish the arguments of the majority are very
likely to leave a reader who has not read the majority opinion with
a distorted view of the merits of those arguments. Mr. Justice
Holmes would be more than human if his dissenting opinions were
always free from the limitations of advocacy and post-rationaliza-
tion of judgments which are in origin not infrequently intuitive.
Mr. Lief, it is true, has supplied introductory notes to each opinion,
but the summaries of the facts and the reasoning of the majority
opinions is too brief to provide a-very adequate picture.
It is submitted, moreover, that this book would afford a truer
picture of Holmes's qualities as a judge if it had contained a few
of his majority opinions even though, by reason of limitations of
space, this involved the omission of some of the dissenting opinions
that this collection contains. Surely no selection of his opinions on
due process is complete -without Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon.1 His dissenting opinions in Long v. Rockwood2 and Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. Mississippis need comparison with his majority
opinion in Gillespie v. Oklahoma,4 which was strongly relied upon
by the majority in the above cases. His opinions in such cases as
New York Central, etc., Railroad Co. v. Miller5 and Brooke v.
City of Norfolk' illustrate one failing of Holmes as a judge, a
certain obscurity which occasionally characterizes his statement of
facts or doctrine, thus tending to confuse rather than clarify the
issues involved and to leave in uncertainty what the court has actu-
ally decided. It is commonly remarked, even by friends of Mr.
Justice Holmes, that he is most happy and effective in his dissent-
ing opinions. The reviewer believes that it detracts nothing from
his stature as a jurist to recognize the existence of such minor and
very human defects. This lack of balance in the collection is not
cured by the insertion in the last chapter of a series of epigrams
and short extracts from his majority opinions
A happy feature of the book is the inclusion of the essay of
Mr. Justice Holmes on Natural Law, which supplies the key to
much of his constitutional philosophy, as expressed in such brilliant
dissenting opinions as those in Lochner v. New York and Tyson v.
Banton. The dissenting opinions are grouped by the editor under
five headings: On Hampering Social Experiments; On Infringing
upon Freedom; On Encroaching upon the States; On Usurp-
ing Power; On Escaping Taxes. In addition there is a chapter
containing three opinions, concurred in by a unanimous court, in
cases arising under the Espionage Act, and the chapter consisting
1. (1922) 260 U. S. 393, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158.
2. (1928) 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463.
3. (1928) 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 451.
4. (1922) 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171.
5. (1906) 202 U. S, 584, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714.
6. (1928) 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 422.
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of excerpts from other majority opinions referred to above. The
adequacy of such a classification no doubt permits of reasonable
difference of opinion. But the reviewer finds some difficulty in
understanding why the editor puts the dissenting opinion in Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart in the chapter on Hampering Social Experiments.
Unlike the minimum wage case, there was no question of the con-
stitutional validity of some legislative control; rather the majority
of the court, whether rightly or wrongly, felt that an attempt by
Congress to legislate in the premises was an unconstitutional en-
croachment upon the powers of the states. The opinions in Longq
v. Rockwood and Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi seem more
properly to belong in the chapter on Encroaching upon the States.
But such criticisms after all relate to matters of detail, and
detract little from the value of this book if it be worthwhile to
publish such a book at all.
University of Chicago Law School. ARTHUR H. KENT.
CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, Vol. 1. By Charles E. Clark.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1930. Pp. xiv 674.
Familiarity with procedural principles is of course vital to the
law student, presuming, as we must, that he intends to try causes
in courts. It is peculiarly imperative that he acquire some of this
familiarity during the earliest stages of his law training, that he
may properly understand the cases presented in his other courses
and measure accurately their comparative conclusiveness. Hence
one attempting to conduct a first year course in procedure requires
the utmost assistance from the book t6 be used in the classroom.
Professor Clark's work is, on the whole, a valuable step toward the
realization of this ideal.
That first year courses in pleading tend to be dry, as pointed
out by the author in his preface, is a conclusion in which practically
all law students and many instructors heartily concur, although it
should be recognized that a large part of this shortcoming is in-
evitable, as inherent in the student's unfamiliarity with the strange
jargon with which he is suddenly deluged.
The general policies of this casebook may be summarized as
(1) emphasis upon current rather than obsolescent problems of
procedure (nearly half of the 230 cases reported as text have been
decided during the past thirty years, and a large proportion during
the last decade), and (2) frank disavowal of the adequacy of cases
only. Both of these factors are according to the latest trend in
law training, and, it might be added, in judicial decisions, under
the leadership of Justice Holmes. These two policies are jointly
served by the textual summarizing of historical background to recent
cases set forth, with references of course to the cases supporting
such summaries. The book ought perhaps to have the more de-
scriptive title already being applied to others of the same type,
namely, "Cases and Materials, etc."
